DETERMINANTS OF AGRICULTURE-RELATED LOAN DEFAULT: EVIDENCE FROM CHINA by Yin, Zhichao et al.
Bulletin of Monetary Economics and Banking, Special Issue 2020, pp. 129 - 150
p-ISSN: 1410 8046, e-ISSN: 2460 9196
DETERMINANTS OF AGRICULTURE-RELATED LOAN 
DEFAULT: EVIDENCE FROM CHINA
Zhichao Yin*, Lei Meng**, and Yezhou Sha***
* School of Finance, Capital University of Economics and Business, Beijing, China.
** School of Business, East China University of Science and Technology, Shanghai, China.
*** Corresponding author. School of Finance, Capital University of Economics and Business, Beijing, China. 
Email shayezhou@cueb.edu.cn.
This paper investigates agriculture-related loan default in 2002–2009 through a large 
data set from a leading Chinese state-owned bank. Using logit regression, we find 
the default rate on agriculture-related loans is significantly higher than that on non–
agriculture-related loans. We find that base interest rates, loan maturity, the type 
of collateral, firm size, ownership structure, and managerial quality rating have a 
significant impact on agriculture-related loan default, but this also depends on how 
agriculture-related loans are defined. The results provide insight into the real impact 
of monetary policy on agriculture-related lending.
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I. INTRODUCTION 
As in many emerging economies, rapid economic growth and industrialization have 
created an ever-widening gap between urban and rural areas in China in terms of 
wealth, infrastructure, and public services (Gan et al., 2014; Yin et al., 2019). Because 
of the large rural population and the implications of underdeveloped rural areas 
for social stability, the Chinese government, as in many other emerging markets 
(Savitha and Kumar, 2016; Dorfleitner et al., 2017), has been giving attention as 
well as priority to the development of rural areas, food security, and improving 
the income of the rural population (or “san nong” in the context of Chinese).1 One of 
the most influential policies has been to encourage financial institutions to expand 
their lending to agriculture-related sectors (Ayygari et al., 2010). Agriculture-
related loans are therefore pivotal to rural development in China.
Using a unique database obtained directly from a Chinese leading bank, this 
paper examines the determinants of agriculture-related loan default. Following 
Yin et al. (2014) and Yin et al. (2019), we apply a hazard model by conducting 
logit regressions. We find agriculture-related loans are more likely to result in 
default than non–agriculture-related loans, after controlling for loan contracts, 
firms, macroeconomics, and weather factors. Besides, agriculture-related sectors 
could have country-specific characteristics relating to default, and a international 
standard definition might not be applicable to single country. In addition, we 
find loan-specific rates and base interest rates co-determine the default rate of 
agricultural loans. Furthermore, the redefinition of default would generally affect 
the influence of contract-specific characteristics on the default of all types of loans. 
Our findings contribute to the literature by identifying distinguishing features 
between agricultural loans and loans in general. They also provide further insight 
into agricultural-related loans based on the work of Yin et al. (2019).
The motivation for investigating the determinants of default on agriculture-
related loans is as follows. First, the amounts involved in agriculture-related loans 
are enormous. By the end of 2014, outstanding agriculture-related loans stood at 
RMB 23.6 trillion (USD 3.8 trillion), accounting for 29% of all outstanding loans in 
China.2 Compared to 2010, not only did size of agriculture-related loans double, but 
also its proportion of all outstanding loans rose by 4% (Ouyang and Zhang, 2019). 
Second, agricultural financial risk is substantial (Morgan et al., 2012). Because of 
the characteristics of the agricultural sector and the underdevelopment of rural 
areas in China, agriculture-related loans involve higher costs, longer periods, and 
higher risks compared to bank lending in other sectors. Therefore, as the amount 
of agriculture-related loans grows, attention has been drawn to the quality of this 
asset class. Third, as a result of the previous point, subsidies are injected into the 
market to encourage financial institutions to engage in agriculture-related loans.3 
This leads to the issue of efficiency, i.e., whether the credit risk on agriculture-related 
loans is fully understood and well managed by state-owned or state-controlled 
1 These refer to the long-term policy of the Chinese government called the Three Issues, or san nong 
(三农). San nong is the abbreviation for increasing agricultural production, increasing farmers’ 
income, and developing rural areas.
2 See also the Quarterly Executive Report of Monetary Policy, People’s Bank of China.
3 See “30% growth in agriculture-related loans and the hidden danger in the subsidised model for 
growth,” The Economic Observer, October 17, 2011.
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banks when executing san nong policies. This is a concern for policymakers and 
critical to the sustainable development of this market (Xie and Jin, 2015). Fourth, 
the literature on loan default involves the determinants of default, the effect of 
collateral on default, and the heterogeneity of borrowers (Savitha and Kumar, 
2016; Zhou et al., 2016; Yin et al., 2019). There is a dearth of literature dedicated to 
the sector-specific credit quality of loans, particularly loans in emerging markets. 
Finally, in an era of high output volatility of agricultural products, this study of 
one of the largest agricultural producers is also of general interest to the world 
community in terms of managing food supply and food security.4
This paper contributes to the literature by filling the void in studies dedicated 
to bank lending in the agricultural sector. The findings reveal the key determinants 
of the credit quality of agriculture-related loans that inform the business operations 
of banking institutions. We are specifically interested in two sets of variables that 
are particularly important in agricultural loans: agriculturally related factors (e.g., 
temperature and rainfall) and loan-specific interest rates. Indeed, we find that the 
two sets of variables significantly determine the default rate in this unique sector. 
We also provide insight for emerging economies on the financial risk in policy-
oriented lending to the agriculture sector.
This paper is organized as follows: Section II reviews the literature related to 
loan default. Section III presents the methodology and data. Section IV interprets 
the results on the default of agriculture-related loans relative to other types of 
loan. It also conducts robustness tests. Section V analyzes the determinants of 
agriculture-related loan default, and Section VI concludes the paper.
II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. Determinants of Bank Loan Default
Identification of the determinants of bank loan default can be traced to Campbell 
and Dietrich (1983), who use US bank loan data to find that the ratio of concurrent 
payments to revenue, the loan-to-value ratio, the unemployment rate, loan 
maturity, and the initial loan-to-value ratio have a significant influence on the loan 
default rate. Berger and De Young (1997) use Granger causality tests and find that, 
when a bank’s capital decreases, the amount of bad loans increases, and there is 
a bilateral intertemporal relation between the quality of loans and cost efficiency. 
In addition, cost efficiency is one of the most important factors for predicting bad 
loans and failing banks.
Elsas and Krahnen (1998) argue that the credit risk with corporations is greater 
than with non-corporations, i.e., partnerships and sole proprietors involve less 
moral hazard. Berger and De Young (2001, 2006) suggest that geographic distance 
increases the costs of information collection and monitoring such that the loan 
default rate increases with the distance between the borrower and the lender. 
Jiménez and Saurina (2004) analyze more than 3 million individual loans in Spain 
between 1988 and 2000 and find that the default rate on collateralized loans is 
higher than for unsecured loans. They also find that savings banks tend to extend 
4 According to the United Nations (UN) Food and Agriculture Organization, China is the largest 
producer of wheat, rice, and so forth.
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loans with higher credit risk and that closer banking relationships between banks 
and firms increase bank risk taking.
Landier, Nair, and Wulf (2005) find that an information-based loan lending 
model can reduce the inefficiency caused by geographic distance, and lenders who 
use credit scoring models face a lower default rate. Conversely, Rossi (1998) and 
Flannery and Samolyk (2006) find that an automated lending model is associated 
with economies of scale, and lending at the breakeven point of credit rating models 
would lead to a higher default rate. De Young, Glennon, and Nigro (2008) find that 
longer distances and lower credit ratings lead to a higher probability of default. 
Jiménez and Saurina (2009) find that default rates are highly correlated with 
economic cycles. In addition, the credit losses on manufacturing, construction, 
consumer, and collateralized loans are generally higher. However, Sha and Wang 
(2019) find that, as long as the debtor’s financial information is controlled for, 
there is no industry effect in determining US default, challenging the intuition 
that macroeconomic conditions have predictive power for default. Using a micro-
level Chinese bank loan database, Yin et al. (2019) reach the same conclusion, that 
borrower heterogeneity dilutes sensitivity to economic change in co-determining 
loan default.
In sum, previous research has identified various determinants influencing 
bank loan default. The role of macroeconomic conditions, previously recognized 
as a determinant of loan default, is now being challenged with new evidence from 
various countries. Most of the literature relies on bank-level consolidated data to 
conducting analyses, and few studies use contract- or individual-level data. Given 
that the decision to default is ultimately made by the borrower, and not the bank, 
data obtained directly from the borrower could provide a clearer picture in this 
research field.
B. Role of Collateral
Many studies focus on the impact of collateral on the default rate. Stigliz and Weiss 
(1981) and Chan, Greenbaum, and Thakor (1987) argue that banks’ requirement 
for collateral when providing loans reduces the adverse selection problem, which, 
in turn, leads to a lower default rate. Aghion and Bolton (1992) and La Porta et al. 
(1998) suggest that, according to creditability threat theory, collateral is an effective 
tool to guarantee borrowers’ good behavior.
Smith and Warner (1979) suggest moral hazard as a determinant of collateral use 
in loan lending, i.e., collateralized debt prevents the borrower from swapping high 
quality assetsto low quality assets, and ties up funds that could otherwise be use to 
finance from projects. Chan and Kanatas (1985) consider the situation in which the 
borrower cannot change the returns of the lender, i.e., in a perfectly competitive 
risk-neutral credit market with no moral hazard. When the creditworthiness of 
the lender and that of the borrower are identical, there is no need for collateral. 
Besanko and Thakor (1987), Bolton and Scharfstein (1996), and Manove, Padilla, 
and Pagano (2001) argue that, when firms use external assets as collateral, banks 
can obtain repayment upon default. This affects borrowers’ motivation of technical 
default and reduces adverse selection. Collateral can substitute for the determinant 
of the quality of the project to be financed. Jiménez and Saurina (2004) also find 
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a negative relationship between the quality of collateral and the credit risk of 
borrowers. Jiménez et al. (2014) find that lower short-term interest rates encourage 
small-cap banks to provide more loans to risky firms without collateral, likely 
leading to greater levels of default. Chen and Lin (2016) show that government 
bail-out programs reduce the default risk for banks, but indirectly increase the 
default risk for borrowing firms.
Other studies find a close relationship between collateral requirements and 
high credit risk in lending. Empirical research shows that collateralized loans face 
higher risk. To some extent, they are called high–default probability loans (see also 
Orgler, 1970; Hester, 1979); in other words these loans have a higher risk premium 
(see also Berger and Udell, 1990; Booth, 1992; Booth and Chua, 2006; Angbazo, 
Mein, and Sanders, 1998; however, these studies are limited to the US loan market).
Igawa and Kanatas (1990) suggest that, in an ex-ante information asymmetry 
credit market, collateral will lead not only to the approval of borrowers’ loan 
applications, but also to moral hazard when borrowers use the loans. Freund et al. 
(1998) argue that collateral-based lending models lead to credit crises.
Manove and Padilla (1999, 2001) think that the higher the amount of collateral 
required, the worse the quality of the loans (ex post credit risk), and the higher 
the default rate. First, when banks receive a guarantee for loans, they will have 
less motivation to filter out potentially problematic borrowers and loans. Second, 
optimistic entrepreneurs usually underestimate their probability of bankruptcy 
and are therefore willing to provide any collateral required to obtain funding.
Based on output, consumption, and foreign debt, Arellano’s (2008) default risk 
model for emerging economies predicts that interest rates and default incentives 
are higher in recessions. Li et al. (2013) show that, in the wake of the 2008 financial 
crisis, agricultural loan delinquency rates were consistently below banks’ overall 
loan delinquency rates. Nwachukwu (2013) identifies the characteristics of the 
beneficiaries of a government-sponsored agricultural loan program in Nigeria to 
investigate the high default rates. Weber and Musshoff’s (2012) results suggest that, 
in the Tanzanian loan market, agricultural firms have lower delinquency rates than 
non-agricultural firms do. Castro and Garcia (2014) and Ouyang and Zhang (2019) 
find that commodity price volatility and climate factors have a modest impact on 
agricultural loans, while macroeconomic conditions for the agricultural sector and 
intermediate input prices have greater influence. Dinterman et al. (2018) study 
how economic factors have impacted farm businesses in the United States. They 
find that macroeconomic factors such as interest and unemployment rates have 
strong predictive power for farm bankruptcies. Escalante et al. (2017) show that 
non-white male and female farm borrowers are usually charged higher interest 
rates than others, which could be attributed to lenders’ credit risk management 
strategy.
Bailey et al. (2011) find that firms with poor performance are more likely 
to receive bank loans, and their subsequent long-run performance is typically 
poor. The authors also note negative stock market reactions, where the share 
prices for Chinese borrowers typically decline significantly around bank loan 
announcements. Chang et al. (2014) used a proprietary database from a large 
Chinese state-owned bank to examine the usefulness of banking relationships in 
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predicting loan default. They find that the contribution of banking relationships to 
predicting default is greater than that of other, hard information.
In sum, the literature has documented the unique structure of agricultural-
related bank loans under formal and informal financing channel theory. The use of 
collateral and government involvement confuses the estimation of genuine credit 
quality of loans in the agriculture sector. Some country-specific research provides 
insights into the issue, but these studies are limited to survey data and small 
samples. In lights of these limitations, Yin et al. (2019) has examined the role of 
collateral played in bank loans by using large dataset from a leading commercial 
bank. Using the same dataset, we are further interested in the determinants of 
credit quality in the agriculture sector.
Morgan et al. (2012) and Yin et al. (2019) point out that agricultural businesses 
are risky. Apart from market and business operation risks, the agriculture sector 
also suffers from additional, weather-related risks. Banks exercise less monitoring 
and control, because agricultural production is located in rural areas where 
transportation and information collection is not so convenient. There is also a lack 
of instruments that agriculture-related businesses can use to hedge these risks, 
because the derivatives market is underdeveloped in China (Ouyang and Zhang, 
2019). Therefore, we form two research hypotheses. The first hypothesis is as 
follows.
 H1: Agriculture-related loans have a higher probability of default than other 
types of loans.
Consistent with works of Campbell et al. (2008), Sha and Wang (2019), and Yin 
et al. (2019), the following logit model is used to examine H1:
where, the borrower i at time t, Default is a binary variable that takes the value 
of zero when the loan is normal, and one if the loan goes bad (see Section 3 on 
the data and variables for the definition of a bad loan, or default), and AR is a 
dummy variable that takes the value of one when the loan is related to agriculture, 
and zero otherwise, with AR defined according to three criteria (see also Tables 
A1–A3 in the Appendix). The first criterion is set by the People’s Bank of China, 
the second by the UN, while the third criterion is set by the National Bureau of 
Statistics of China. Due to the broad coverage of the criterion of the People’s Bank 
of China, it is widely used in the Chinese banking industry. We adopt this criterion 
to classify agriculture-related loans. The other two criteria are used to check the 
sensitivity of the results to the choice of agriculture-related loan classification. Due 
to the higher credit risk involved in agriculture-related lending, the coefficient is 
expected to bear a positive sign.
(1)
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In line with Yin et al. (2019), we use the following loan information variables 
to explain the probability of default: maturity, amount, repayment method, type 
of guarantee, and interest rate, where maturity is either short, medium, or long 
term.5 We introduce two dummies (MID and LONG) for the maturity of loans, i.e., 
the first one taking the value of one if the loan is medium term, and zero otherwise, 
and the other taking the value of one if the loan is long term, and zero otherwise. 
We use the logarithm of the loan amount as the size of the loan (Amount). The 
interest rates on loans are calibrated by two variables, i.e., the logarithm of the base 
interest rate (BaseIR) and the logarithm of the range of loan-specific interest rate 
fluctuations (FloatIR). The repayment methods are a bullet payment at maturity 
(BulletP), periodic interest payments plus principal at maturity (PeriodicP), 
customized periodic repayments (CustomizedP), and standard periodic payments. 
The types of guarantee include unsecured (Unsecured), guaranteed (Guaranteed), 
collateralized (Collateralized), pledged (Pledged), and discounted notes (Disnotes), 
which are assigned binary variables of the same name.
To examine the effect of firm-specific characteristics on the quality of loans, 
following Liu et al. (2019) and Yin et al. (2019), we control for four categories of 
managerial quality rating, i.e., excellent, average, restricted, and knockout, and firm 
size, denoted as mega-sized (Mega), large (Large), medium sized (Medium), or small, 
We also control for the ownership structure, i.e., state-owned enterprises (SOE); 
collectively owned enterprises (CO); stock cooperative enterprises (SC); associated 
enterprises (AE); limited liability companies (LTD); corporations (CORP); private 
enterprises (PRI); foreign enterprises (FOR), including Hong Kong, Macau, and 
Taiwanese enterprises; and other enterprises, including, e.g.,, sole proprietor and 
partnership. These indicators are binary variables of the same name in the analyses.
We control for the size of the borrowers by classifying them as mega-sized, 
large, medium sized, and small. We use the 12-month-averaged temperature 
(TEMP) and precipitation (RAIN) levels in the same area as control variables for 
the weather (see also Sha and Wang (2019) for a discussion on using the 12-month-
averaged value in predicting default). To control for the impact of time-varying 
macroeconomic factors, we introduce year dummies, and  as a residual term. 
We use a logit model to estimate Equation (1). Considering that credit quality is 
a discrete variable, we also use an ordered logit model to estimate Equation (1).
Monetary policy is an important systemic risk factor in determining credit 
risk of loans in China, not only because a tighter monetary policy drains liquidity 
for businesses, but also because it signals the arrival of a less favorable business 
climate (Ayyagari et al., 2010). We thus propose the following hypothesis.
 H2: Compared to changes in loan-specific interest rates, tightening in monetary 
policy, i.e., an increase in base interest rates, is more likely to lead to default in 
agriculture-related loans.
5 To avoid perfect collinearity, we do not include the short-term dummy variable in the regression. 
Similarly, we do not include the dummy variables proxying for standard periodic payments, 
unsecured guarantees, knockout ratings, “small-sized” loans, and other enterprises.
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To further investigate the determinants of agriculture-related loan default and 
to test H2, we use the following model to estimate a subsample of only agriculture-
related loans:
(2)
If H2 is valid, BaseIR will have a significant, positive sign, whereas FloatIR 
should be nonsignificant. The control variables include contract- and firm-specific 
control variables, as well as weather variables and the year dummies, exactly as in 
Equation (1).
III. DATA AND RESEARCH METHODS 
This paper uses corporate loan data for 2002–2009 from a leading state-owned 
bank in China.6 To avoid sample selection bias, we exclude loans that were made 
during this period but which will mature after 2009. In our data set, credit risk is 
measured by the five categories of loan quality (in descending order), i.e., normal, 
concerned, subprime, suspicious, and a loss. According to industry practice, the 
last three categories are usually classified as bad loans. Therefore, we introduce a 
binary variable that takes the value of one if the loan is subprime, suspicious, or 
a loss, and zero otherwise. To check the sensitivity of the results to the choice of 
default, we use the method of Ping and Yang (2009), reclassifying bad loans to also 
include the concerned category.
The descriptive statistics (see Table 1) show that mid- and long-term loans 
account for only a small proportion of the sample. The loan amount can have a 
wide range. In terms of repayment types, while customized periodic payments 
are rarely used, periodic and bullet payments are much more common. Loans 
backed by discounted notes or collateral are much more common than guaranteed 
or pledged loans. The borrowers are often small and medium-sized companies. 
Using the same data set, Yin et al. (2019) find that the default rate of non–
agriculture-related loans is 6.38%, whereas that of agriculture-related loans is 
much higher, at 11.6%. To further analyze the credit risk on agriculture- and non-
agriculture–related loans, we compare the status of these two types of loans. While 
the proportion of non–agriculture-related loans with normal status is higher 
than that of agriculture-related loans (81.6% vs. 75.84%), the proportions of non–
agriculture-related loans with a lower credit quality status are smaller than those 
of agriculture-related loans (Yin et al., 2014).
6 According to the bank’s request, we are restricted from disclosing further details in published 
articles. 
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Table 1.
Descriptive Statistics of Explanatory Variables
This table reports selected descriptive statistics for all variables used in the paper. AR is a dummy that takes the 
value of 1 when the loan is agriculture-related and 0 otherwise; MID and LONG are dummy variables for loans with 
mid-term and long-term maturities, respectively; BaseIR is the official interest rate set by People’s Bank of China, 
depending on the maturity of the loan; FloatIR is the range of loan specific interest rate changes; Amount is the log of 
the amount of the loan; BulletP, PeriodicP, and CustomizedP payment are dummies for loans with these three methods of 
repayment; Guaranteed, Collateralised, Pledged; and Disnotes are dummies for the types of collateral; Excellent, Averaged 
and Restricted are dummies for borrowers with such managerial ratings; Mega, Large and Medium  are dummies for 
the size of the borrowers; SOE, CO, SC, AE, LTD, CORP, PRI, and FOR are dummies for the ownership structure of the 
borrowers. TEMP and RAIN are the annual mean temperature and mean precipitation respectively.
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
AR 115395 0.1170 0.3154 0 1
MID 115395 0.0277 0.1640 0 1
LONG 115395 0.0007 0.0262 0 1
BaseIR 115395 1.5840 0.3085 -1.2730 2.8904
FloatIR 115395 1.4123 0.0529 -0.8210 2.5832
Amount 115395 13.6674 1.6673 4.6052 22.3327
BulletP 115395 0.3967 0.4892 0 1
PeriodicP 115395 0.5806 0.4935 0 1
CustomizedP 115395 0.0075 0.0866 0 1
Guaranteed 115395 0.0970 0.2959 0 1
Collateralized 115395 0.3916 0.4881 0 1
Pledged 115395 0.0348 0.1833 0 1
Disnotes 115395 0.4516 0.4977 0 1
Excellent 115395 0.5431 0.4981 0 1
Averaged 115395 0.3200 0.4665 0 1
Restricted 115395 0.0613 0.2398 0 1
Mega 115395 0.0657 0.2477 0 1
Large 115395 0.0927 0.2901 0 1
Medium 115395 0.3813 0.4857 0 1
SOE 115395 0.1015 0.3019 0 1
CO 115395 0.0304 0.1716 0 1
SC 115395 0.0850 0.2789 0 1
AE 115395 0.0076 0.0870 0 1
LTD 115395 0.1903 0.3925 0 1
CORP 115395 0.1990 0.3992 0 1
PRI 115395 0.2918 0.4546 0 1
FOR 115395 0.0328 0.1781 0 1
TEMP 115395 2.0475 1.1064 0.5600 3.4700
RAIN 115395 0.0099 0.0160 0.0002 0.0645
IV. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
A. Basic Results
The results presented in Table 2 are based on the People’s Bank of China’s definition 
of agriculture-related loans. Table 2 shows a very significant positive relationship 
between being agriculturally related and default, i.e., agriculture-related loans are 
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more likely to result in default than other types of loans. This result is consistent 
with H1, i.e., agriculture-related loans in China are riskier and less controllable 
than other types of loans.
Table 2.
Agriculture-related loans and credit risk
We report the marginal effects of Logit regression following equation (1): Pr(Defaultit=1)=α+βARit+γXit+μit and the 
results are reported in this table. The detailed description is reported in Section III. Cluster-adjusted standard errors 
are presented in parentheses. The sample period is 2002-2009.
Variables Marginal Effects Standard Error
AR 0.0011*** 0.0002
MID 0.0033*** 0.0005
LONG 0.0052* 0.0031
BaseIR 0.0047*** 0.0006
FloatIR 0.0038*** 0.0010
Amount 0.0001** 0.0000
BulletP 0.0003 0.0009
PeriodicP 0.0013 0.0009
CustomizedP 0.0018 0.0015
Guaranteed 0.0003 0.0003
Collateralized 0.0004 0.0003
Pledged -0.0001 0.0003
Disnotes -0.0172*** 0.0012
Excellent -0.0047*** 0.0005
Averaged -0.0019*** 0.0002
Restricted -0.0006*** 0.0001
Mega -0.0004 0.0014
Large -0.0015*** 0.0002
Medium -0.0009*** 0.0001
SOE 0.0012*** 0.0003
CO 0.0023*** 0.0004
SC -0.0008 0.0003
AE 0.0005*** 0.0005
LTD -0.0007*** 0.0002
CORP 0.0007*** 0.0002
PRI -0.0003* 0.0002
FOR 0.0000 0.0003
TEMP 0.0005*** 0.0001
RAIN 0.0372*** 0.0050
Year Dummy Yes -
Observation 115269
Pseudo R-squared 0.283
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Regarding firm-specific characteristics, medium-term loans (Medium) and 
long-term loans (Long) are more likely to default than short-term loans; however, 
the effect for long-term loans is weak. This finding is consistent with theory and 
previous empirical studies, (e.g., Campbell and Dietrich, 1983). The base interest 
rate has a positive relationship with default in logit estimation; i.e., loans granted 
during a high–interest rate period are more likely to end up in default. The interest 
rate float (FloatIR) has a positive relationship with loan default, i.e., interest rate 
adjustments specific to large loans are associated with reduced ability to repay. 
A positive relationship between the loan amount (Amount) and default is found, 
i.e., the larger the loan (higher Amount), the more likely the default. However, this 
relationship has only modest economic significance. In our sample, repayment 
methods do not have a significant impact on loan default, although one would 
expect bullet payments to be riskier than periodic repayments, since, in the former, 
the entire cash flow occurs at maturity. The type of guarantee has a significant 
impact on default, i.e., loans backed by discounted notes have a much lower 
chance of default. Discounted notes (Disnotes) have stable value and are liquid; 
therefore, the cost of default for borrowers is high. This result is consistent with the 
works of Aghion and Bolton (1992) and La Porta et al (1998).
Managerial quality has a significant impact on loan default, i.e., in comparison 
to firms rated excellent, average, and restricted, those with knockout ratings 
(Knockout = 1) are more likely to default. This finding is intuitive, i.e., low-quality 
management can make inferior decisions that can lead to the failure of the firm. 
The effect of firm size on loan default is remarkable; i.e., while mega-sized firms 
contribute to higher levels of default, large to medium-sized firms are less likely 
to default. Regarding firm ownership structure, state-owned enterprises and 
collectively owned enterprises are more likely to default. Logit estimations show 
that stock cooperative, limited liability, and private firms are less likely to default.
Weather also plays a role in loan default. When TEMP and RAIN increase, the 
chances of default increase accordingly. However, the effect of temperature seems 
to be very modest. This result is consistent with the work of Castro and Garcia 
(2014), in that warmth and rainfall contribute to agricultural production as long as 
they do not surpass certain thresholds. The Year dummies have an effect on default; 
however, in this paper, the main idea is for them to absorb macroeconomic factors 
that are not included in our control variables.
Table 3 shows ordered logit estimations of Equation (1). The results are 
consistent with those in Table 2, where agriculture-related loans have a higher 
probability of default than other types of loans.
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Table 3. 
Agriculture-Related Loans and Credit Risk - Ordered Logit
We report the results of Ordered Logit regression following equation (1): Pr(Defaultit=1)=α+βARit+γXit+μit are reported 
in this table. X is the vector of control variables that are reported in Section III. The order is as the credit quality 
of loans which is cut in five categories: Normal=1, Concern=2, Subprime=3, Suspicious=4 and Loss=5. Credit risk 
increases with the number. Cluster-adjusted standard errors are presented in parentheses. The sample period is 2002-
2009.
Variables Coefficients Standard Error
AR 0.192*** (0.0279)
MID 0.525*** (0.0445)
LONG 0.860*** (0.200)
BaseIR 0.652*** (0.0819)
FloatIR 2.582*** (0.294)
Amount 0.0659*** (0.00800)
TEMP 0.230*** (0.0185)
RAIN 5.594*** (0.737)
Repayment method Yes -
Type of guarantee Yes -
Managerial rating Yes -
Size Yes -
Ownership Yes -
Year dummy Yes -
Cut1 9.697*** (0.735)
Cut 2 11.38*** (0.736)
Cut 3 11.95*** (0.737)
Cut 4 13.20*** (0.738)
Observations 115,382
Pseudo R-squared 0.304
B. Robustness Checks
B.1. Alternative Definitions of Agriculture-related Loans
The results in Table 4 are based on the definitions of agriculture-related loans 
by the UN and by the Chinese Bureau of Statistics. When the Chinese domestic 
classification is used, there is a positive relationship between the loan’s probability 
of being agriculture-related and default. This positive relationship is not 
statistically significant, however, when the UN classification is applied. This result 
could suggest that agriculture-related sectors have country-specific characteristics 
and that a international standard is not applicable. Compared to the People’s Bank 
of China’s classification, alternative definitions lead to nonsignificant relationships 
between interest rates and loan default. The repayment method, type of guarantee, 
firm size, ownership structure, management ratings, and time have very similar 
effects on loan default, regardless of how agriculture-related loans are defined. 
Generally, agriculture-related loans are more likely to result in default than non–
agriculture-related loans are.
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B.2. Alternative Definitions of Default
We follow Ping and Yang (2009) to redefine default to include loans with a concerned 
status, to check the sensitivity of the results to the definition of loan default. Table 
5 shows that agriculture-related loans have a consistently higher default rate than 
non–agriculture-related loans do. Both BaseIR and FloatIR have a much stronger 
positive effect on default than on the previous definition of default. We therefore 
conclude that our main findings do not vary due to alternative default definitions.
Table 4.
Agriculture-Related Loans and Credit Risk – Alternative Definition of Agriculture-
Related Loan
We estimate the equation (1): Pr(Defaultit=1)=α+βARit+γXit+μit following two standard that defining agricultural loans 
in China and in UN (see Table A and B in the APPENDIX for details). The table reports coefficients of two regressions. 
The detailed description is reported in section 3.1. Cluster-adjusted standard errors are presented in parentheses. The 
sample period is 2002-2009. 
Variables
Domestic classification of 
economic sectors (1)
United Nations 
classification of sectors (2)
AR 0.020** 0.009
(0.010) (0.006)
MID 0.076*** 0.076***
(0.011) (0.011)
LONG 0.112** 0.112**
(0.053) (0.054)
BaseIR 0.004 0.004
(0.008) (0.008)
FloatIR 0.060 0.059
(0.037) (0.037)
Amount 0.003* 0.003*
(0.001) (0.001)
TEMP 0.035*** 0.002*** 
(0.001)  (0.0002)
RAIN 1.047*** 0.055***
(0.050) (0.006)
Repayment method Yes Yes
Type of guarantee Yes Yes
Managerial rating Yes Yes
Size Yes Yes
Ownership Yes Yes
Year dummy Yes Yes
Constant -0.201** -0.199**
(0.082) (0.082)
Observations 115,319 115,319
Pseudo R-squared 0.281 0.281
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Table 5.
Agriculture-Related Loans and Credit Risk – Alternative Definition of Default
We estimate the equation (1): Pr(Defaultit=1)=α+βARit+γXit+μit  by using Ping and Yang (2009) definition, i.e. redefining 
default to include loans with “Concerned” status, to check the sensitivity of the results to the definition of loan 
default. The table reports marginal effects of regression. The detailed description is reported in Section III. Cluster-
adjusted standard errors are presented in parentheses. The sample period is 2002-2009.
Variables Marginal Effects Standard Error
AR 0.0023** 0.0011
MID 0.0130*** 0.0024
LONG 0.0559*** 0.0210
BaseIR 0.0249*** 0.0032
FloatIR 0.1120*** 0.0136
Amount 0.0030*** 0.0003
BulletP 0.0305** 0.0126
PeriodicP 0.0468*** 0.0102
CustomizedP 0.0860*** 0.0308
Guaranteed 0.0505*** 0.0054
Collateralized 0.0489*** 0.0038
Pledged 0.0127*** 0.0038
Disnotes -0.1196*** 0.0046
Excellent -0.0675*** 0.0028
Averaged -0.0207*** 0.0014
Restricted -0.0074*** 0.0013
Mega -0.0241*** 0.0046
Large -0.0052*** 0.0017
Medium -0.0024*** 0.0008
SOE 0.0067*** 0.0020
CO 0.0102*** 0.0028
SC -0.0111*** 0.0022
AE 0.0028 0.0042
LTD -0.0122*** 0.0014
CORP -0.0076*** 0.0015
PRI -0.0192*** 0.0014
FOR -0.0231*** 0.0014
TEMP 0.0049*** 0.0007
RAIN 0.1130*** 0.0295
Year Dummy Yes -
Observation 115269
Pseudo R-squared 0.330
B.3. Determinants of Default on Agriculture-related Loans
To further investigate the determinants of default on agriculture-related loans, i.e., 
those related to loan contract information and firm-specific characteristics, we run 
Equation (2) using the agriculture-related loan subsample.
Table 6 shows that medium-term agriculture-related loans are more likely to 
result in default. The same effect is found for long-term loans, however weak. 
Generally, our analysis suggests that default increases with loan maturity. The 
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higher BaseIR is, the more likely the agriculture-related loan will end up in default, 
while FloatIR does not have a significant impact on agriculture-related loan default. 
This result is attributed to the vulnerability of the agriculture sector in China;7 i.e., 
the resilience of agriculture-related loans to risk is low, and macroeconomic shocks 
can precipitate their default. This finding confirms H2, i.e., monetary policy is an 
important systemic risk factor in determining credit risk on loans in China, even 
when the loan-specific rate is given and controlled for.
7 This vulnerability refers to losses due to adverse weather, natural disasters, and the volatility of the 
prices of agricultural products.
Table 6.
Determinants of default on agriculture-related loans
We estimate the equation (2): Pr(Defaultit=1)=α+βBaseIRit+γFloatIRit+θXit+μit  to check the sensitivity of the predicting 
variables. The table reports marginal effects of regression. The detailed description is reported in Section III. Cluster-
adjusted standard errors are presented in parentheses. The sample period is 2002-2009.
Variables Marginal Effects Standard Error
MID 0.0146*** 0.0048
LONG 0.0349* 0.0187
BaseIR 0.0043** 0.0020
FloatIR -0.0019 0.0054
Amount -0.0003* 0.0002
BulletP -0.0012 0.0082
PeriodicP -0.0005 0.0097
CustomizedP -0.0002 0.0090
Guaranteed -0.0015 0.0064
Collateralized 0.0001 0.0010
Pledged 0.0000 0.0009
Disnotes -0.0006 0.0010
Excellent -0.0197*** 0.0030
Averaged -0.0112*** 0.0030
Restricted -0.0034*** 0.0009
Mega -0.0017*** 0.0005
Large 0.0003 0.0013
Medium -0.0027*** 0.0008
SOE 0.0000 0.0008
CO 0.0039* 0.0021
SC -0.0002 0.0014
AE -0.0025** 0.0013
LTD -0.0013* 0.0007
CORP 0.0007 0.0009
PRI -0.0011 0.0007
FOR 0.0007 0.0017
TEMP 0.0038*** 0.0009
RAIN 0.1497*** 0.0350
Year Dummy Yes
Observations 13052
Pseudo R-squared 0.209
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Regarding loan contract-specific information, the type of guarantee has no 
effect on agriculture-related loan default, as for other types of loan. With respect 
to firm-specific information, firm size affects the default rate: mega- and medium-
sized firms are found to have lower chances of default. Managerial quality ratings 
have a significant effect on default, i.e., borrowers rated as excellent have the 
lowest default rate, followed by average borrowers and restricted borrowers, 
with knockout borrowers most likely to default. This finding is consistent with 
other types of loans. The weather effect is still significant and consistent with non–
agriculture-related loans.
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper investigates agriculture-related loan default in China. Consistent 
with our hypotheses, agriculture-related loans are more likely to result in default 
than non–agriculture-related loans, after controlling for other factors. The only 
exception is when the UN classification is used. This could suggest that agriculture-
related sectors have country-specific characteristics and an international standard 
definition is not applicable to single country. An alternative definition of default 
does not change the conclusion that agriculture-related loans are more likely to 
default than non–agriculture-related loans are. However, such a redefinition of 
default generally affects the influence of contract-specific characteristics on the 
default of all types of loans.
In the analysis of the determinants of agriculture-related loans, we find that 
default increases with maturity. However, unlike other types of loan, long-term 
agriculture-related loans do not show a significantly higher credit risk than their 
short-term counterparts. This result could be because the agriculture-related 
subsample does not encompass as many long-term loans, since financial institutions 
engaged in agriculture-related lending do not usually wish to have prolonged 
exposure to a single entity. We also find that the higher the base interest rate, the 
more likely agriculture-related loans will end up in default, while loan-specific 
interest rate fluctuations do not have a significant impact on agriculture-related 
loan default. These two findings are consistent with our hypotheses and could be 
attributed to the low resilience of the agriculture-related sector to macroeconomic 
shocks. Guaranteed and collateralized agriculture-related loans are also more 
likely to result in default. This finding suggests that the moral hazard arising from 
the introduction of guarantees and collateral requirements could contribute to 
the credit risk of agriculture-related loans. Firm-specific characteristics, such as 
firm size, the borrower’s managerial quality, and ownership structure also have 
a significant influence on the default of agriculture-related loans. Remarkably, 
the agriculture-related loans in our sample show a downward trend in default 
between 2003 and 2008.
Our findings confirm the concerns of financial institutions that agriculture-
related loans are generally riskier than non–agriculture-related loans. 
Policymakers should pay more attention to the impact of macroeconomic policies, 
such as monetary policy, on systemic risk in the agriculture-related loan market. 
An agriculture-related derivatives market, such as weather derivatives, could be 
developed to help agriculture-related businesses better manage their uncontrollable 
Determinants of Agriculture-Related Loan Default: Evidence from China 145
risks. For financial institutions, borrower-specific risk characteristics should play 
an important role in lending decision, while the design of loan contracts is also 
essential. The systematic study of the determinants of agriculture-related loan 
default contributes to the literature on the credit risk of loans from a sector that is 
critical to the fundamental wellbeing of the world population.
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APPENDIX
Table A1.
Definition of agriculture-related loans – People’s Bank of China Classification
Loan Type Code Loan Type
1111 Agriculture
1211 Forestry
1311 Livestock farming
1411 Fishing
1511 Service to agriculture, forestry, livestock farming and fishing
1611 Agricultural infrastructure
1621 Agricultural product processing
1631 Agricultural product export
1632 Circulation of other agricultural material
1641 Agricultural science and technology
1651 Rural area infrastructure
1661 Manufacturing of agricultural tools and equipments
1711 Other agriculture-related
1811 Particular non agriculture-related
2111 Agriculture - individual
2121 Forestry – individual
2131 Livestock farming - individual
2141 Fishing - individual
2151 Service to agriculture, forestry, livestock farming and fishing - individual
2161 Other individual agricultural activities
2211 Rural student loans
2221 Other rural consumer loans
9999 Other
Table A2.
Definition of agriculture-related loans – China domestic classification
Loan Type Code Loan Type
A101 Agriculture
A102 Forestry
A103 Livestock farming
A104 Fishing
A105 Service to agriculture, forestry, livestock farming and fishing
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Table A3.
Definition of agriculture-related loans – UN classification*
Loan Type Code Loan Type
A011 Grains and other crops planting
A012 Vegetables and horticultural products planting
A013 Fruits, nuts, beverage and fragrance products planting
A014 Herbal medicine crops planting
A021 Trees planting and cultivation
A022 Timber and bamboo logging
A023 Forestry products collection
A031 Livestock breeding
A032 Pig breeding
A033 Poultry breeding
A034 Hunting
A039 Other livestock farming
A041 Sea fishing
A042 Inland fishing
A051 Services to agricultural sector
A052 Services to forestry sector
A053 Services to livestock farming industry
A054 Services to fishing industry
*International Standard Industrial Classification of All Economic Activities Rev 4
